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resources.10 In some areas, the EU shares competences with its Member States, including in the fields of transport, energy, economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as the environment. Shared competence means that once the EU regulates a particular issue, actions of Member States are limited. There are also fields of complementary competence, where the EU institutions are allowed to act without constraining Member States' competences, including tourism, culture and education.11
Secondly, the EU's influence is visible via numerous funding instruments. The Union budget is a major source of financing for Arctic research with about EUR 150 million on Arctic-related research spent during the previous multiannual seven-year financial perspective (which encompassed the International Polar Year).12 That effort is likely to be matched or exceeded under Horizon 2020 program running from 2014.13 Further, the EU provides funding for regional development and cross-border co-operation. EU structural programs are of key importance for northernmost Finnish and Swedish regions, which face challenges of remoteness and sparse population, in some cases being among the poorest regions with the lowest development potential in their respective states.14 The same can be said about the EU-supported cross-border co-operation programs in the North (such as Northern Periphery and Arctic Program or Northern Dimension partnerships). Moreover, the EU provides support for development of education and training in Greenland as a part of the EU-Greenland Partnership Agreement. 15 Thirdly, the EU takes part in co-operation with other actors (including Arctic States). For example, the EU, Canada and the US adopted the Galway Statement on Atlantic Ocean Co-operation,16 which includes joint efforts in Arctic research. Since 2010, and in the aftermath of the seal ban, the EU has The EU's special relationship with Greenland18 revolves primarily around fisheries and enhancing human resources. 19 The EU's Raw Materials Initiative20 emphasizes resource diplomacy and securing resource imports from stable and well-governed regions. The co-operation with Greenland (and potentially Canada) is supposed to be a step towards achieving that objective. 21 The EU is also involved in developments in northwest Russia via its regional and crossborder funding (e.g. Kolarctic program).22 EU funding finds its way to the Russian Arctic also via the Northern Dimension (ND), a Finnish initiative from the 1990s, which developed into a common policy of the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia from 2006. Different "partnerships"-through which ND cooperation is organized-support, among others, feasibility studies for much desired East-West transport connections in the European North or environmental infrastructure in northern Russian settlements. 23 The EU can also influence development of international norms and decisionmaking that are of relevance for the region. EU competences as regards setting rules for maritime transport make the European Commission's Directorate General Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) (responsible for transport) an important actor in any international negotiation referring to maritime traffic. This has included negotiations in the International Maritime Organization (IMO)24 as regards the mandatory Polar Code (International Code for Ships At the regional level, the European Commission is a full member of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and provides a significant portion of the funding for cross-border co-operation in the Barents region. In the Arctic Council, the EU acts in practice as an observer and its representatives are active in several of the Arctic Council's working groups, including the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) and the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME).
The EU's regulatory power, its relations with trade partners and its influence on international processes are relevant for the Arctic because the EU's internal market, its economy and population exert a noticeable environmental and economic footprint on the region. Among others, the 2010 EU Arctic Footprint and scope of competences shared between the Member States and the Union, the EU and Member States meet before the IMO (and its committees) meetings in order to speak, where possible, with a single voice. REACH Regulation39 and POPs Regulation40 are good examples of EU policies affecting long-range pollution. While these policies are primarily important for the environment of highly industrialized regions in Europe, they are also relevant for regulating contaminants reaching the Arctic.
The best-known case of the EU's formally internal rules influencing Arctic regions-owing to the EU's leverage as a major market-is the regulation banning the placing of seal products on the EU market.41 Originating both from animal welfare concerns and the introduction (or the processes leading to the introduction) of bans by several Member States, and underpinned by powerful campaigns by animal rights organizations, the so-called seal ban significantly affected the livelihoods of both commercial sealers in Canada and Inuit hunters. The latter, while in principle exempted from the ban, claimed they were impacted owing to the overall collapse of the global seal skin market following the introduction of the EU ban. 42 The ban caused outrage among many Arctic communities as well as Inuit organizations and-for several years-led Canada to prevent the EU from gaining formal observer status in the Arctic Council. focus.50 The Arctic Ocean, interactions with Arctic coastal States and seadependent indigenous peoples (like the Inuit) comprised Arctic policy space for the EU policy-makers. However, the idea that the EU should develop its own overarching approach to the Arctic activated various actors from the European part of the Arctic, who felt that the EU formulates Arctic policy ignoring the part of Europe located above the Arctic Circle, that is the northernmost regions of Finland, Sweden and Norway.51 Crucially, these actors would like to use the greater EU interest in the Arctic to emphasize their own priorities and to encourage the Union's support to developing responses to various economic, demographic, social or accessibility challenges faced by Europe's northern communities. Reacting to these calls, the EU Arctic policy had gradually acquired a second, European Arctic dimension. That has become particularly visible in the 2016 Joint Communication.
European Arctic regions are directly affected by EU environmental, transport, energy and competition legislation. For example, the EU's Natura 2000 network-based on the Habitats and Bird Directives52-establishes a very strong conservation framework for large swaths of European Arctic ecosystems. In the 1990s, for example, a major hydropower project in Northern �� for Finnish maritime transport in the Baltic Sea. This could potentially raise transport costs for Lapland's resource exports, and therefore it resulted in critical industry voices as regards the EU policy.64 While for some stakeholders the Natura 2000 constitutes a welcome additional protection for the highly fragile sub-Arctic environment, for others it appears to be a far-reaching constraint on regional development, disproportionally affecting northernmost regions. In sum, on one hand, the EU shares a number of similarities with other external Arctic actors, such as China or Japan. The EU's industrialized centers are far from the region, but influence the Arctic in various ways. On the other hand, owing to direct EU presence as a policy-maker and funding-provider in Northern Europe, the EU is a sui generis case in the landscape of Arctic governance. It is an influential yet secondary external player as regards circumpolar affairs, and at the same time a crucial actor in the European part of the Arctic.
Coherence and Added Value of the Overarching EU Arctic Policy
The above overview suggests that an overarching EU Arctic policy is bound to be a "sum of many parts", and the spectrum of issues that the EU Arctic policy is to encompass is very broad. The resulting "all-encompassing" Arctic policy framework is bound to be multifaceted. Moreover, the EU Arctic policy is also component-driven,65 which means that it brings together issues anchored in various sectoral policies, policies that are primary/antecedentin terms of time and the position in the policy system-to the cross-cutting Arctic framework. These characteristics of the EU Arctic policy raise questions as to whether a framework bringing together these different "parts" can genuinely facilitate better EU performance as a polity affecting the Arctic. The 2016 Joint Communication70 is an attempt to introduce more focus into the EU's key Arctic statement. To a certain degree that has been achieved, as the emphasis is on fewer issues-those where the EU's leverage in Arctic affairs is the clearest. The document identifies three "priority areas" for the EU's action in the Arctic:
• Climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment • Arctic (primarily European Arctic) and Arctic-related economic development • International cooperation However, these areas still encompass a variety of issues including climate research, adaptation, investments, coordination of EU funding, biodiversity protection, innovative Arctic technologies, transport and communication links, space technologies, maritime safety, dialogue with indigenous people and the EU's participation in regional co-operation. It is unclear how these aspects are interrelated, though the relative chaos of the 2012 document has not been repeated. There are still no overarching objectives that guide the EU's approach towards the region. Regional development trajectories to which the EU funding and policies are to contribute are not defined. Many mentioned actions are already ongoing or are included in the "Arctic policy" as a part of pre-existing general EU policy frameworks, such as climate mitigation, investments, research, or air pollution policy. Some statements that refer to future or planned activities are vague and do not include clear commitments on the side of the EU. That should not be seen as criticism, rather an acknowledgement that the formulation of an "integrated" EU Arctic policy is highly unlikely, despite the claim contained in the title of the 2016 policy document. Rather than providing direction and consistency for the multifaceted EU activities, the 2012 and 2016 joint communications still serve primarily as public relations statements directed towards both Arctic actors and the public of the EU. They justify EU Arctic engagement and highlight the role of the EU in the Arctic.
Can the EU Arctic policy-making go beyond listing activities and justifying the EU's interests in regional affairs? Can the Arctic policy-making truly bring together various EU activities and make a positive difference in the EU's presence in the Arctic? These questions invoke two interrelated notions: added value (making a positive difference) and coherence (bringing together).
First, an overarching Arctic policy is expected to "make a difference". Added value can be understood as something that appears when a cross-cutting policy is more than just a "sum of its parts", when the act of bringing together is followed by changes in policies and actions or in new activities.
"Bringing together"71 means not only producing an inventory but also introducing some minimal degree of coherence and coordination into the EU Arctic-relevant policies and activities. Østhagen72 submits that the "natural end goal of the EU's Arctic policy development is a coordination of EU policies interlinked with, or influencing, the Arctic region". Coordination can be seen as a set of practices and arrangements (institutional, functional) to enhance the coherence of the polity's activities,73 a crucial element of "procedural coherence".74 On the one hand, coherence can be understood as minimizing contradictions between different aspects of EU regional presence (consistency, negative coherence). On the other hand, enhancing positive coherence means finding synergies in order for different actions to strengthen one another, to The EU institutions have pronounced that one of the tasks of the EU Arctic policy framework is to introduce more coherence into the EU policysystem (across its external and internal dimensions) as regards the Arctic. The 2012 Joint Communication was described as a pathway towards a "coherent approach".76 In 2014, the European Parliament called for the formulation of a "united EU policy on the Arctic" and a "coherent strategy and concretized action plan on the EU's engagement in the Arctic",77 while the Council of the European Union (EU Council) requested the European Commission to work towards "further development of an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy".78 Following the EU Council's request, the 2016 Joint Communication is presented as an "integrated EU policy". It is unclear what "integrated" is to mean in the EU Arctic context. It certainly does not refer to establishing an overarching policy, the objectives of which would overshadow sectoral approaches, as is supposed to be the case, for instance, with the EU's Integrated Maritime Policy. Rather, integration refers to juxtaposing different policies and actions andconfusingly-integrating (i.e. anchoring) the "Arctic policy" into the EU's preexisting regulatory and policy system. 79 The challenge of introducing coherence or integration is a result of the component-based character of the Arctic policy. Policy statements are collections of actions arising from general policies. These actions are thus not designed or chosen based on an Arctic-specific assessment of needs or on Arctic-specific The abovementioned shortcomings of the EU Arctic policy documents and lack of synergies between actions are not, however, a result of the failure of EU policymakers. Rather, they are outcomes of the character of this region-focused policy field as a component-based framework. Aiming at formulating a coherent set of EU-Arctic objectives and drafting comprehensive yet focused documents is extremely challenging if not impossible. Instead, the EU policymakers should focus on strengthening the procedural dimension of coherence which comprises mechanisms for enhancing consistency in Arctic decision-making. 80 The questions of procedural coherence and added value of the EU Arctic policy have three practical challenges for the Arctic policy-making in the EU. The first challenge is how to bring together various policy fields, in particular those specifically aimed at European and Circumpolar Arctic. The second challenge is how to facilitate the relatively marginal cross-cutting Arctic policy framework to make a tangible difference in the way the EU interacts with the region through sectoral policies and actions. The third challenge is managing the EU's interactions with Arctic stakeholders and actors. The 2012 Joint Communication rendered all three challenges visible. The 2016 Joint Communication constitutes a step towards addressing them.
Challenge One: Balancing Diverse Spaces: European and Circumpolar Arctic
The diverse set of issues that fall under the umbrella of the EU Arctic policymaking reflects two dimensions of the EU's presence in the region. 
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In contrast, European Arctic challenges are chiefly terrestrial. In this European Arctic policy space, the EU is a policy-maker, regulatory actor and a source of funding. Among relevant stakeholders in this policy space are Europe's northernmost regions (in Brussels grouped within the Northern Sparsely Populated Areas network),84 the Sámi, reindeer herders, local businesses, the mining industry, and national environmental NGOs.
In the Circumpolar Arctic, the EU occupies a back seat, and for many Arctic stakeholders it remains a secondary actor. In the European Arctic, the EU is a key player, and EU institutions are targets of intense regional lobbying. Some actors in the Circumpolar Arctic appear to be anxious about the EU's presence,85 while many in the European Arctic are contrastingly anxious that the EU's interest and involvement in the Arctic are not strong enough.
The 2016 Joint Communication is clearer than previous documents in terms of distinguishing the two geographic policy spaces. However, introducing clearer wording may not be enough to accommodate diverse interests that play out within the EU-Arctic nexus. In an analysis for the Arctic Institute, Stępień86 proposed to resolve the intermingling of European Arctic and Circumpolar Arctic policy fields by formulating the EU Arctic policy as a two-tier framework: an overarching policy for the Circumpolar Arctic, and within it, a focused strategy for the European Arctic. A Circumpolar Arctic policy could then retain its current set of general, vague objectives or policy keywords. It would include maritime issues, climate change mitigation, climate and ocean research, earth observation, involvement in the Arctic Council, and the EU's role in shaping Arctic-relevant international norms.
A focused strategy for the European Arctic would address challenges arising from the Arctic transformation as they are manifested in the Europe's northernmost regions. A short list of specific goals or targets would need to be identified together with Nordic States, northernmost regions and local stakeholders, with the involvement of the EEA partners. Relevant issues here include cooperation within the Barents region (Barents Euro-Arctic Council, where the European Commission is a full member) and transport networks extending to Russia and Norway. Building on the experiences of the EU macro-regional strategies,87 the precondition for the feasibility and effectiveness of such a strategy is that concrete action plans are agreed and that all relevant actors commit to the targets and to the implementation of actions. "Strategy" is a word often avoided by external Arctic actors. This is owing to the notion that strategy entails a certain degree of control over the geographic space and is aimed at achieving concrete goals towards securing specific interests. Calling the whole EU (Circumpolar) Arctic policy "a strategy" could therefore trigger anxiety among Arctic states.88 However, the EU's more coherent approach towards the European Arctic could certainly constitute "a strategy"; exactly because the EU institutions, Member States and EU actors have a great deal of control over developments in the region and have direct, tangible interests in its sustainable development. Indeed, when the calls for a "coherent strategy" are voiced-such as in the 2014 European Parliament Resolution-usually they refer to the European Arctic affairs. 89 The 2016 Joint Communication makes a step towards devising a European Arctic strategy. In 2017, the European Arctic Stakeholder Forum together with a network of EU funding programs attempt to identify overarching key investment and research priorities for the European Arctic. The Forum is to include regional and national authorities as well as other stakeholders, with participation of Norway, Iceland and Greenland. The Forum is supposed to deliver its proposals for priorities by the end of 2017.
Several possible goals for the European Arctic strategy could be envisaged. Actors will face the need to jointly address climate adaptation in Europe's fastest warming region, with increased flooding, impacts on winter roads and winter tourism raised among future concerns.90 Strategic targets could include also the North-South and intra-regional (East-West) transport networks, digital connectivity, as well as tackling developmental or demographic problems specific to these sparsely populated areas It is unlikely that the strategy will include long-term institutional arrangements, mechanisms for policy co-ordination, and dedicated funding instruments supporting specific European Arctic priorities, adding to existing programs. The EU has adopted an approach to its macro-regional strategies (for the Baltic Sea Region, Danube, the Alps, Adriatic-Ionian Region or for Atlantic) based on the principles that no new institutions are to be created, no new funding instruments established and no new regulations adopted ("3xNO"). Therefore, the proposed Arctic Stakeholder Forum is to be a temporary, short-lived mechanism-finalizing its work in 2017-with its legacy to be carried on in the framework of loose annual stakeholder conferences rather than any institutionalized arrangement.
Instead of creating new programs, the strategy would streamline existing financing, prevent duplications and in the long-term affect priorities for funding instruments. The concept of the European Arctic Stakeholder Forum is heading precisely in that direction. In addition, ideas indirectly supporting European Arctic strategic priorities within already operating programs could be considered. A good example of such a mechanism is the Seed Money Facility within the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR).94 It provides seed grants for work on proposals directed to various EU programs for projects that match the EUSBSR priorities. In terms of institutional arrangements, currently the EU Arctic policy is coordinated jointly by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG Mare), with the involvement of various Commission DGs and agencies such as the European Environment Agency and European Maritime Safety Agency. The coordination is conducted via the Arctic Inter-Service Group, which serves primarily information purposes.95 However, the European Arctic strategy could be ultimately led by the Commission's units responsible for regional development, transport or environment. While any additional organizational arrangements may be difficult for the Arctic policy as a whole, the European Arctic strategy-similarly to macro-regional strategies-could be supported by networks of responsible officials from different Member States, EEA States and regions.96 Moreover, regional stakeholder forums and conferences-as proposed in the 2016 Communication-could strengthen the long-term interaction between actors.
Challenge Two: Influencing Sectoral Policy-making in the EU
The precondition for a cross-cutting framework to have added value is its capacity to influence EU sectoral decision-making processes.97 Only actions dedicated to coordination, dialogue and outreach have been so far carried out within the EU Arctic policy itself. 98 In order for Arctic policy to enhance the EU's presence in the Arctic, the actions need to be taken within sectoral policies, such as environment, transport, energy, external relations, or international ocean governance. The critical aspect is therefore the interlinkage between the Arctic policy-making and sectoral, substantial policies.
May et al.99-building on Dery's100 concept of a "policy by the way"-proposed a notion of "component-driven policies" to describe the Arctic policies of Canada and the USA. May et al. and Dery suggest that for identity-based and space-based policy domains (such as youth policy or regional policies) it is sectoral, primary policies that determine the content of cross-cutting frameworks. That undermines the possibility for these frameworks to be coherent, but also limits the influence of the cross-cutting policies on polities' tangible actions. Sectoral policies have a much longer history, established communities of stakeholders and advocacy coalitions, as well as well-grounded institutional arrangements. The component-driven character of the EU Arctic policy is visible from the policy documents, which so far have simply collected existing Arctic-relevant activities. The role of EU Arctic policy-makers has been not to propose new objectives and set a course for EU Arctic action, but rather to choose among different possible sets of Arctic-relevant actions, prioritize and organize them in a sensible manner.
Arctic policy within the EU is a rather marginal policy topic. EU services are not willing to invest any greater resources even in coordination activities.101 It is unlikely that it will follow the path of, for instance, environmental or climate policies, which over the years have moved to a central position in policy systems worldwide.
In some cases, the new "Arctic dimension" is primarily an act of re-labeling. for instance, in the process of adopting the EU Directive on the safety of offshore oil and gas extraction,104 which includes several references to the Arctic. Another good example is research. In a survey conducted among European research organizations,105 several respondents suggested that a strong visibility of Arctic topics in the Horizon 2020 research program could be partly attributed to EU Arctic policy-making. 106 The interest in the Arctic resulted also in the launch of the EU-Polarnet project, which is to develop the European Polar Research Program and enhance the coordination of European Polar research infrastructures. 107 The process of developing a cross-cutting Arctic policy also translates to increased EU exposure to Arctic actors and stakeholders. For instance, the EU adopted a conciliatory position in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)108 as regards banning international trade in polar bear products. Instead of trade prohibition, the EU proposed requesting information on health of polar bear populations, on the levels of harvesting and trade and on feasibility of tagging regime for polar bear products. 109 The EU action in this way demonstrated sensitivity to Inuit, Greenlandic and Canadian concerns.
In the future, Arctic policy-making may play a role in the EU's actions regarding international ocean governance and as regards the protection of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction and establishing marine protected areas in the high seas. The preparatory work on a new global agreement has already started under the UN General Assembly.110 While these issues are of special importance for the Central Arctic Ocean, the EU position is likely to be shaped primarily by global concerns and balancing with developing States' interests.111
While the new Arctic perspective on problems and stronger interactions with stakeholders is of intrinsic value, the EU should build on these qualities and consider procedural opportunities for enhancing the way Arctic policymaking influences the EU's sectoral activities and actions.
The primary means is facilitating internal flows of information, in order to raise awareness of the specific impacts EU actions have in the North. The Arctic Inter-Service Group of the European Commission serves such information purposes, but it operates only among lower officers responsible for Arctic matters. How, if at all, that information is conveyed within specific DGs depends on the particular case and on the personal interest of policy officers.112 The tangible co-operation going beyond information exchange within the EU services occurs, not on an on-going basis, but during the work on policy statements (2012 or 2016 communications and accompanying staff working documents) or cross-sectoral activities, such as preparation of a survey for Streamlining EU Arctic funding consultations.113 Some policy ideas and instruments are, however, worth exploring in this context.
One such policy idea is "Arctic footprint management". Major external actors take part in shaping Arctic realities owing to long-range pollution, economic influence via market leverage and resource demand, as well as via influence on private actors under their jurisdiction. Due to these "Arctic footprints", polities like China, the EU and Japan have in their policy arsenals the capacity to control their impact on the Arctic. "Footprint management" requires three steps. First, polities need to assess and acknowledge their impact on the Arctic. Second, there needs to be a mechanism for communicating the knowledge on Arctic footprints to sectoral-primarily domestic-policy-making. This way, the awareness of Arctic footprints becomes a part of policy processes. Third, a regular monitoring of the polity's footprint has to be carried out. The EU has shown a responsible approach early in its Arctic policy-making by commissioning the EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment Report. 114 Following the project results, the EU partly acknowledged its own responsibility for the Arctic environment in the 2012 Joint Communication.115 However, EU officials have not been successful in channeling Arctic-specific concerns into general policy-making yet. Moreover, despite suggestions from the European Environment Agency116 and the EU Arctic Information Centre initiative network,117 a periodic monitoring and reassessment of the EU's Arctic footprint has not been adopted. On the other hand, the footprint approach has proven interesting enough that the European Commission is conducting studies-based on a similar methodology-for EU policy impacts on the South Mediterranean region and the Eastern Partnership countries.118
Better coordination among EU institutions, between the EU and its Member States as well as coordination with the activities of other actors present in the Arctic is in principle a basis for better flow of information. It could prevent any unnecessary overlaps and could help to identify gaps that the EU policies and EU funding could fill. Certainly, the very process of Arctic policy-making leads to a better overview of what Arctic-relevant activities different departments, agencies and EU actors engage in. The European Commission also commissioned an inventory of a broad range (EU, Member States, institutions and private sector) of European Arctic initiatives. 119 The 2016 Joint Communication proposed establishing the European Parliament's delegation and the Council's working party dedicated to northern cooperation and Arctic issues. While especially the latter is unlikely to be established, neither addresses the key need for the intra-EU flow of information: from the officers responsible for Arctic affairs to the teams working on Arctic-relevant policy and regulatory developments.
One concrete way in which Arctic concerns (including Arctic footprints) can be communicated to general policy-making processes is via regulatory impact assessments (IAs). IAs are conducted by the European Commission and EU services-sometimes with input from external experts or consultancies-in order to consider different alternatives and review the expected impacts of applied policy instruments, including for different constituencies and regions. 120 The European Commission's IAs of proposed policies or regulations could incorporate a special focus on how new policy or legislative proposals influence the Arctic.121 Due to the complexity of both Arctic realities and EU policy frameworks, the identification of policies that have consequences in the Arctic constitutes a major challenge and requires stakeholder engagement. Taking Arctic issues into account is particularly important in areas where EU policies designed for a broad European constituency may yield specific consequences in the context of Arctic-specific challenges, such as remoteness, long distance, Arctic nature-based livelihoods, sparse population or vulnerability of Arctic environment. This is likely the case for regulations or policies in fields like transport, environment, ocean governance or rural policy. 122 A significant part of information on Arctic-specific concerns and impacts would need to be acquired from a broad spectrum of Arctic actors and stakeholders. This leads us to the third problem related to coherence and added value of EU Arctic policy-making, namely handling interactions between EU institutions and Arctic stakeholders. Enhanced participation enables understanding of values and livelihoods that might be neglected from the perspective of densely populated European economic centres, where human-environment relations (e.g. subsistence use of forests) may not be as vital for culture and identity as in the North.124 EU cohesion and co-operation programs in the North are an example of added value provided by stakeholder involvement. There, the key role of local actors in setting objectives has resulted in the alignment of local perceptions of needs and challenges and the goals of EU-funded programs. 125 However, when carrying out stakeholder engagement activities, the EU institutions need to take into account the limited capacities of many Arctic actors126 and better coordinate various stakeholder consultations mechanisms. Recently, a number of processes carried out by different EU services have involved the same groups of stakeholders, including: 'Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of Development of the Arctic' commissioned by the DG Environment; operation of the Arctic NGO Forum (overseen by DG Environment project on creating space for exchange between NGOs focused on Arctic, primarily environmental, issues);127 the DG MARE consultations on streamlining Arctic funding; and the work with stakeholders within the EU-Polarnet process leading to the European Polar Research Program, supervised by the DG Research. The 2016 Joint Communication adds to these processes the European Arctic Stakeholder Forum, goal of which is to identify overarching investment and research priorities, partly overlapping with the aims of the EU-Polarnet. Moreover, annual stakeholder conferences and the EU Arctic Policy Assessment128 process are to complement this landscape of spaces for engagement.
Furthermore, the EEAS and the European Commission have engaged Arctic indigenous organizations within the format of the so-called Arctic Dialogue. First taking place in 2010, this dialogue has become more regular starting from 2013. However, these meetings are mainly filled with presentations on various indigenous-relevant EU projects rather than discussing challenging issues. The discussions should be more focused and concrete, including practical, pressing matters and EU strategic interests in the Arctic. Possible questions could include the EU's strategic interest in developing EU-domestic resource extraction or infrastructural projects potentially supported by the EU. 129 The interaction with indigenous peoples needs to be linked up to other stakeholder engagement processes.
In the context of stakeholder engagement it must be remembered that indigenous people are also rights-holders. The participation of indigenous people (in particular the Sámi) in decision-making should be addressed in the light of evolving international indigenous rights (including land rights and the principle of free, prior and informed consent), primarily the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.130 Responsible decision-making with regard to EU policies that may affect Arctic indigenous communities requires their meaningful participation. The concept of establishing a more permanent presence of the Arctic indigenous peoples or the Sámi in Brussels remains relevant.131 Such representation has to be independent from state and regional authorities and would need to address the constraints of indigenous organisations' human and financial capacities.
Better streamlining of different consultation mechanisms would avoid stretching the capacities and patience of Arctic academics, NGOs, policymakers, and in particular local and indigenous communities. The 2016 Joint Communication does not deliver on such streamlining. Moreover, clear feedback on how consultation outcomes influenced specific decision-making is necessary to ensure participants remain engaged.132
Conclusion
The scope of EU engagement in the Arctic is vast. The broad set of Arcticrelevant issues brings two distinct dimensions to the EU's presence in the Arctic: the Circumpolar and European Arctic. These spaces entail different foci (maritime versus terrestrial, environmental versus economic) and different composition of relevant stakeholders. In the European Arctic the Union is a key player, while in the pan-Arctic affairs it takes a back seat. The very diversity of Arctic-relevant policies, activities and external interactions suggests that it is unlikely that concrete, focused and operationalizable objectives of EU Arctic policy will ever be proposed. While abstract objectives may be necessary in order to give EU Arctic policy a recognizable identity and a narrative, such objectives will not translate into policy coherence across sectors and will not cause the EU Arctic policy to have an added value within the EU's policy system. The EU needs to focus on procedural mechanisms and instruments for coherent policymaking. Three challenges can be highlighted in this context: first, balancing between European Arctic and Circumpolar policy spaces; second, exerting effective influence on general policy and decision-making processes in the EU; and third, managing the multiplicity of interactions with Arctic actors and stakeholders. There are options that the EU should consider in order to address these three challenges. Distinguishing between the European and Circumpolar Arctic affairs and maybe even adopting a separate focused strategy for the European Arctic could lead to a clearer overarching framework. The 2016 Joint Communication takes the first steps in this direction. There is a need for better visibility of Arctic issues in EU policy-making, including via assessment, acknowledging and monitoring of the EU's Arctic environmental, economic and regulatory footprints. The intra-EU coordination and information flows regarding Arctic concerns could be improved, with regulatory impact assessments supported by stakeholder engagement playing a central role. Eventually, the numerous instances of interactions with Arctic actors should be streamlined in order to avoid overstretching the limited capacities of Arctic stakeholders. Considering the character of a cross-cutting policy dedicated to a transnational region, the EU Arctic policy is likely to remain a constant work in progress. By focusing now on procedural aspects of its interaction with the Arctic region, the EU can in a more realistic fashion make an increasingly positive contribution to the state of the Arctic and its governance in the long-term.
